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Many studies have looked at resilience during 
natural disasters and national emergencies in a 
number of countries but hardly any have 
concentrated on developing countries and the 
implications of these nations’ sub-standard 
healthcare infrastructure, culture practices and 
relaxed control systems.  This paper examines 
resilience during Liberia’s recent EBOLA epidemic 
and identifies lessons to be learned by others 
including executives of Non-Governmental 
Organizations frequently working on disaster relief 
projects in developing countries. The author builds 
on existing bodies of work and presents arguments on 
why governments in developing countries dealing 
with disaster management and disease emergencies 
should encourage communities to innovate 
autonomously as an important pathway to resilience.  
While the author does not provide specific 
recommendations, the paper proposes an approach 
that can connect the concerns of those implementing 
resilience initiatives and vulnerable populations by 
harnessing their potential for innovating 
autonomously. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As Liberians confronted Ebola outbreak (March 
2014 -- December 2015) and global observers 
grappled with preventing its widespread, the local 
people demonstrated resilience by preserving the 
social culture of handshakes and customary burial 
ceremonies. Unable to predict the new society in 
post-Ebola Liberia, community leaders were 
sufficiently resilient in buttressing a pretty good set 
of drivers to shape future public health practices and 
influence decisions about implementing a robust 
health system of international standards [29].  
WHO defines a health system as one designed to 
coordinate all the activities required to promote, 
restore and/or maintain health of individuals and 
populations [29]. Inadequacy of healthcare systems in 
Liberia, facilitated the ease with which Ebola spread 
from one village in Guinea to threaten the lives of 
every resident and over 11,000 deaths within a 2-
years period [3]. Despite Liberia’s Harvard-trained 
president, certain cultural differences confound the 
absorption and reaction responses to various types of 
management decision and implementation of 
strategic plans for preventing Ebola.  
This paper investigates the determinations and 
resilience of the local people, and determines whether 
a particular type of leadership can provide nurturing 
ground for a predictive model, applicable to disaster 
resilience [7]. It begins with a rationale for the study 
and declares the need to answer the overarching 
research question for this study: “What character 
traits or quality of society was on display in Liberia 
during the Ebola crises? Next, it summarizes relevant 
literature on Liberia’s unstable past for an 
understanding of the research context before 
presenting a justification for the research method. 
That is followed by some discussions of the results 
before concluding by suggesting a model that links 
global healthcare strategy and national government 
commitment to the behavior of citizens during 
disasters emergencies. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
Resilience—as a concept—appears in a large 
number of disciplines, presenting numerous 
definitions. Not only do these definitions emphasize 
different elements or attributes of resilience but also 
speak in a general way to the ‘continued ability of a 
person, group, or system to adapt to stress—any sort 
of disturbance—so that it may continue to function, 
or quickly recover its ability to function, during and 
after stress’ [1]. Resilience has also been defined as 
the capacity of an entity—such as a person, an 
 institution, or a system—to withstand sudden, 
unexpected shocks, and (ideally) to be capable of 
recovering quickly afterwards [8].  Resilience, thus, 
implies both strength and flexibility, where a resilient 
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structure would bend, but would be hard to break 
[21].   
Africa’s oldest republic, similar in size to Ohio 
State was formed when the American Colonization 
Society (ACS) purchased a 50-mile stretch land from 
6 indigenous tribal chieftains for $100,000 to provide 
home for freed US slaves [9].  Now a Christian state 
on the West coast of Africa (mainly Baptist, 
Methodist, Presbyterian, Protestant Episcopal, 
Lutheran, Roman Catholic and Seventh Day 
Adventist). Liberia has many Muslims and tribal 
religions are practiced in some rural areas. Though 
enriched with iron ore, timber, diamonds, gold, and 
hydropower, 80% of the 2.5 million inhabitants 
consisting of 28 tribes, reside in the capital city [14].   
Liberians started to prove resilience when 
political upheavals began in 1980s, followed by a 
brutal 14-year civil war (1989-2003) resulting into a 
steep decline in the living standards of Liberians, 
including education and health infrastructure. After 
successfully contesting the 2005 presidential 
elections, the Harvard educated Mrs. Ellen Johnson-
Sirleaf was inauguration on January 16, 2006 and 
became the first female President in an African 
State—reelected in 2011.   
During the Ebola crises, she strived to lead a 
government considered an operational organization—
seen as an entity that offered predictable, dependable, 
capable and adaptable action in support of people at 
risk of, or affected by, outbreaks and emergencies, in 
ways that strengthen local and national capabilities 
[27]. An operational organization needs to be [28]: 
 present in outbreaks and emergencies – at local 
levels, and nationally; 
 capable of leading, coordinating and 
implementing key public health functions; 
 equipped with adequate capacity to support 
implementation of these functions; 
 ready to engage quickly and openly with other 
actors for health; and 
 consistent in reflecting humanitarian principles, 
including impartiality. 
Governments dealing with disaster must factor in 
socio-organizational conditions of all citizens—
leaving no divide between various stakeholders [6] 
[20].  
 
2.1 Ebola Outbreak  
CDC (2016) defines Ebola—previously known as 
Ebola hemorrhagic fever—as a rare and deadly 
disease caused by infection with one of the Ebola 
virus species resulting to disease in humans and 
nonhuman primates (monkeys, gorillas, and 
chimpanzees). First discovered in 1976 near the 
Ebola River (in Democratic Republic of Congo), the 
disease is caused by infection with a virus of the 
family Filoviridae, genus Ebolavirus named by CDC 
[3].    
The latest outbreak began when Emile Ouamouno 
(a 2-year old Guinean) lost her bottle to Ebola on 28 
December 2013.  Despite the cancellation of 
Liberia’s 167th Independence Day celebrations and a 
ban on international flights to Liberia, the disease set 
off a worldwide epidemic risking the lives of 
232,222,273 in West Africa and an additional 
491,108,421 in the USA and Central Europe as well 
as the death of more than 11,300 people (see Table 
1). It also resulted to the mobilization of a multi-
billion dollar global response by WHO in 2015 [10].   
Table 1 shows Liberia amongst six countries that 
recently experienced widespread transmission but 
were able to transition and declared free of Ebola 
virus transmission—except Sierra Leone where a 
new confirmed case was identified in 2016 [4]. WHO 
requires that such country remains free of Ebola virus 
transmission after 42 days (two incubation periods) 
had passed since the last Ebola patient tested 
negative.  
 
Table 1: Countries with Confirmed EBOLA Cases & 




2.2. Healthcare Infrastructure 
Healthcare infrastructure is “ensuring well-
coordinated, high-quality health care that requires the 
establishment of a supportive health information 
system” [15]. The conditions for a high-performance 
health systems include a well-distributed workforce, 
information systems for data collection, quality 
improvement analysis, and clinical communication 
support, as well as the organizational capacity to 
support culturally competent services and ongoing 
improvement efforts [23].  Health authorities in most 








Number of Cases 
Suspected Confirmed Deaths 




6,315,627 14,124 8,706 3,956 
Liberia, West Africa 1-14-2016 4,396,554 10,678 3,163 4,810 
Guinea, W. Africa 12-29-2015 12,275,527 3,814 3,358 2,544 
Nigeria, W. Africa 10-29-2014 177,475,986 20 19 8 
Mali, W. Africa 1-18-2015 17,086,022 8 7 6 
USA, N. America N/A 318,857,056 4 4 1 
Senegal, W. Africa 10-17-2014 14,672,557 1 1 0 
Spain, C. Europe N/A 46,404,602 1 1 0 
Italy, C. Europe N/A 61,336,387 1 1 0 
UK, C. Europe N/A 64,510,376 1 1 0 
Totals 723,330,694 28,652 19,261 11,325 
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care delivery systems designed to support 
community-based resources. 
Many considered the Ebola crises a window of 
opportunity for West African governments to not 
only reform healthcare infrastructure and other 
institutional structures, but also establish long-
standing policies with WHO for better healthcare 
systems in Sub Sahara Africa.  Similarly, a UN high 
level panel on global response to Ebola observed that 
inadequate understanding of the cultural context and 
poorly designed messaging undermined the response 
at the community level [29].  The panel also 
recommendation that Governments in developing 
countries strengthen and streamline their community 
engagement and promote local ownership and trust. 
Their report demanded evidence of the following 
[29]:  
 National authorities and UN partners support the 
development and use of national social science 
research capacities, along with an international 
network of social scientists capable of 
mobilizing during a crisis period; 
 Principles of effective community engagement 
are featured in all training program for national 
and international responders.  
 National authorities and partners draw on the 
potential for South-South cooperation in this 
field.  
 Communication strategies are developed with 
due consideration given to the cultural context.  
Healthcare systems also represent true 
interpretation of authorities’ performance in key 
functions of the national development process [9].  
While some may describe the healthcare system in 
Liberia as self-managed care [22] the lack of a 
modern healthcare infrastructure contributed to a lack 
of information support to provide the basis for 
continuity in patient records and clinician 
communication at a time of medical need [5][19]. 
  Public health lacks appreciation in many 
developing countries for improvement in the 
knowledge of existing human resources. Evidence 
from Western countries show that investing in 
community health workers leads to a sustainable 
success in virus containment [14][23].  Like most 
developing countries, Liberia has very high 
unemployment rates, along with a substantial supply 
of educated people residing in the West, leaving 
government to scramble for qualified people when 
crises hit. 
In a report presented at the 59th World Health 
Assembly, the director general noted that reform of 
WHO’s work in health emergency management 
recognized the special importance of rapid, accurate 
and objective assessments of risks of potentially high 
consequences [34].  A program was recently initiated, 
under the Executive Director, to do on-the-ground 
assessment when notified of a high threat pathogen 
(for example, human-to-human transmission of a 
novel influenza virus), clusters of unexplained deaths 
in high-vulnerability/low-capacity settings, and other 
events deemed appropriate at the discretion of the 
Director-General [31].  
The availability and assignment of a culturally 
competent health care workforce has significant 
advantages for access to care [12], particularly in 
developing countries and especially within the most 
vulnerable populations—low-income and uninsured 
or underinsured population [2].  
A WHO panel recommended the implementation 
of complementing health systems with development 
programming [29].  They noted that a strong health 
systems can be undermined by wider developmental 
challenges. Several interlocutors identified 
inadequate water and sanitation, energy, 
communications, transportation and road networks as 
major obstacles to improving health services. The 
Panel also recommends greater complementarity of 
development efforts with a view to supporting 
strengthened health systems in developing countries, 
particularly in rural communities where access to 
healthcare is the most limited [31]. They also 
recommended that WHO works closely with 
development actors to ensure development 
programming supports health systems and help to 
improve universal and equitable access to quality 
healthcare [29]. 
At the G7 Ise-Shima Summit, G7 leaders, 
committed to take the following concrete actions for 
advancing global health and dealing with public 
health emergencies [10]: 
 In addition to its wider reform agenda, urge and 
support the WHO to implement its reforms for 
outbreaks and health emergencies, in a timely 
manner, recognizing also its resource needs, with 
the understanding that the WHO should continue 
to play the central role in global public health 
crisis preparedness and response. 
 Welcome the reform of the WHO including to, 
(i) establish one single approach for outbreaks 
and health emergencies, with one clear line of 
authority among all levels of WHO and ultimate 
accountability with the Director General as 
crystalized in the One WHO approach across 
three levels of the Organization, (ii) strengthen 
capacity and human resources at all levels, and 
(iii) install an independent mechanism to oversee 
and monitor the WHO’s performance on 
outbreaks and health emergencies. 
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 Recognize that an operationally robust and 
technically competent WHO is crucial for 
supporting countries. 
Some recommendations for achieving national, 
systematic and clinical culture competencies from 
literature are as follows [17]: 
I. National cultural competence focus on promoting 
information dissimilation by national leadership 
during early stages of health emergencies for 
developing countries: 
 Programs that advance information dissimilation 
should be encouraged and existing programs 
should be strengthened in order to develop a 
cadre of information distribution through 
academia, government, and private institutions. 
 National governments should make it a priority 
to invest in and promote emergency planning 
within the healthcare infrastructure. 
 Local leadership should be formally or 
informally involved in deadly disease 
prevention’s planning and quality improvement 
meetings, whether as part of the local healthcare 
board or as part of focus groups. 
II. Systemic cultural competence recommendations 
focus on eliminating systemic or institutional barriers 
to planning for emergencies and improving the health 
care system’s ability to monitor and improve the 
quality of information about disease crisis [19]: 
 Health professionals at county and regional 
levels should play a significant role warning 
local population about deadly diseases at a very 
early stage. Their local influences and ability to 
interpreter healthcare services, such as remote 
telephone or simultaneous interpretation, should 
be used in settings with fewer Ebola patients or 
with limited financial or human resources. 
 Key health information should reflect the 
appropriate level of health literacy, language 
proficiency, and cultural norms for the local 
populations being served. This includes signage, 
specific programs for health promotion and 
deadly disease prevention, health education 
materials, pre- and post-procedure instructions, 
informed-consent forms, and advanced 
directives. 
 International partners, including USA and 
Europe, should require systemic cultural 
competence interventions, involving ethnic data 
collection and use of local interpreter services) as 
part of their assistance to national dealing with 
Ebola. 
III. Clinical cultural competence recommendations 
involves enhancing health professionals’ awareness 
of cultural issues and health beliefs while providing 
assistance to elicit, negotiate, and manage 
information about deadly disease [21]: 
 Doctors and nurses should recognize various 
cultural impediments in preventing deadly 
diseases such as Ebola. 
 International clinical staff should enforce 
equivalent requirements mandating the provision 
of international standards for healing patients of 
deadly diseases. Their employers (usually 
international institutions) should be held 
accountable for sub-standard services they 
provide that may prolong deadly diseases. 
 Researchers and mangers should identify tools to 
detect medical errors that result from lack of 
systemic cultural competence, including those 
stemming from language barriers. This may 
involve allow a patent to take a prescribed 
medication incorrectly; misunderstanding health 
education materials, instructions, or signage or 
even inappropriately preparing for a diagnostic, 
resulting in postponement or delay; and 
misunderstanding the benefits and risks of 
procedures requiring informed consent. 
 Government of developing countries that receive 
WHO support should collect data on ethnicity, 
and language preference for all beneficiaries, 
members, and clinical encounters to facilitate the 
monitoring of disparities, the reporting of quality 
data, and the implementation of initiatives to 
prevent deadly diseases like Ebola. 
 
3. Research Method  
 
Literature shows how research in emergency 
situations presents many challenges beyond those 
normally encountered by social scientists [14]. 
Precautions from Ebola affected the methodological 
side of our research process. Data from our fieldwork 
have good validity and reliability, despite taking 
necessary precaution for safety within a very life-
threatening context.  Certain methodological 
flexibility involving two major components were 
applied to the survey.  The sampling process and the 
data collection were completed using telephone 
interviews as the mode of data collection. 
Literature review was also structured around 
questions likely to be of interest to healthcare policies 
in developing countries researchers, and whether 
healthcare infrastructure would be a feasible and 
affordable venture for preventing another deadly 
disease in the future [11][25].  Literature on the 
Liberian civil war and its developed path were 
reviewed for important theoretical and empirical 
contributions relating to resilience.  Computer 
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searches resulted from the following keywords: 
Liberia, Ebola epidemics, civil war, government 
strategic decisions, disaster management, natural 
disaster, and international partnerships for crisis 
prevention. Analysis of these papers provided useful 
insights that resulted into the following main research 
questions—meant to aid the creation and 
accumulation of knowledge in national healthcare 
infrastructure for developing countries:  
1) How can the known input, process, and outcome 
of Ebola outbreak in Liberia support people 
facing similar outbreaks elsewhere?   
2) How well did the Liberian government manage 
the Ebola crisis?  
3) Did the actions of local population contribute to 
Ebola spread/cessation?  
 
3.1. Data Collection 
Primary data was collected through semi-structure 
interview, via telephone, with people who lived in 
Liberia during the recent outbreak of Ebola in 
Liberia, including a number of Americans and 
Europeans who visited Liberia during this period. All 
telephone calls were made between January 2015 and 
December 2015.  Telephone interview was 
considered the best data collection strategy during 
and immediately after the outbreak of a deadly 
disease as this offered the following advantages:  
 quick distribution and response cycle;  
 relatively low cost (cheaper than flying to a 
neighboring country or distributing laptops to 
participants; 
 accurate recollection of details; and  
 no risks of the researcher contacting or being a 
potential carrier of the disease. 
Prior to the telephone interviews, the 
questionnaire was pre-tested among several Liberians 
living in USA and Europe who had a reasonable good 
understanding of the healthcare delivery systems in 
Liberia.  At the end of each individual interview it 
was indicated that additional analysis would be 
undertaken, especially to assess the quality of data 
collected in the survey. Respondents were also asked 
whether they were happy to give permission to link 
their answers with the official international reports 
about the Ebola crisis based on records held by WHO 
and CDC. Everyone gave consent and encouraged 
their neighbors and friends who were experiencing 
similar situation in Liberia to participate in the 
research. 
As a result, few adjustments were made to the 
questionnaire to ensure respondents would have a 
deeper understanding of the research objectives. 
Respondents were allowed extra time towards the end 
of the telephone interview to add additional topic of 
relevance to the research objectives. 
 
Gender Percent Count 
Male 35% 21 
Female 65% 39 
Age Range of Participants Percent  Count 
15 – 21 8% 5 
22 – 30 12% 7 
31 – 40 30% 18 
41 - 50 17% 10 
Above 50 33% 20 
Which part of the Country do you live normally? Percent Count 
Central Monrovia 27% 16 
Greater Monrovia 50% 30 
Other big cities in Liberia 17% 10 
Small towns in Liberia 7% 4 
Highest Educational Level Percent Count 
University Graduate 17% 10 
University Student  18% 11 
High School Graduate 42% 25 
Elementary School Graduate 13% 8 
Never went to School 10% 6 
Questions About Participants Perception of Ebola Management Percentage Count 
Are you a member of the Ebola Control Management Team? 15% 9 
Have you taken care of a relative or friend who may have 
Ebola symptom? 
83% 50 
Should the borders have been closed to prevent the Ebola crisis 78% 47 
Did the Government make the right decision at the beginning 
of Ebola? 
22% 13 
Did the Government make the right decision when people were 
dying? 
67% 40 
Did the Ebola end as a result of good decisions by the 
Government? 
97% 58 
Should people be allow to bury family members who died from 
Ebola? 
18% 11 
Did everybody do their best to prevent the spread of Ebola? 38% 23 
Do you trust this government to prevent another Ebola 
outbreak? 
75% 45 
Are you presently engaged in farming to sustain yourself 
during the Ebola outbreak? 
65% 39 
Did the national government communicate Ebola prevention 
properly? 
5% 3 
Were competent health workers available in your area to 
prevent Ebola? 
30% 18 
Were the equipment good enough in your area to prevent 
Ebola? 
7% 4 
Is the International community doing enough to safe Liberians 
from Ebola? 
15% 9 
Is the International community doing enough to prevent Ebola 
from spreading outside the Liberian border? 
89% 54 
Table 2: Partial data from Telephone Survey 
 
3.2. Sample Data 
The demographic data of the sample were 
collected by asking the respondents their gender, age, 
education level, organization level and their amount 
of work experience in the field (see Table 2). The 
average age of the respondents was 45 years old, with 
the standard deviation of 10. Respondents` age varied 
from 19 to 68 years. Male respondents made up 35% 
of the sample and 65% were female, as is 
characteristic of the general Liberian population. The 
highest educational level attained was, 17% 
university, 18% college level,  42% high school, and 
13% elementary school level, while 10% of the 
respondents did not have any formal education. 45% 
of the respondents had no role in the Ebola control 
process, 83% had personal commitment to look after 
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family member of close friend but no official 
government designated status, 77% of respondents 
lived in Monrovia or its suburbs while 17% lived in 
other big cities but 7% lives in small rural towns in 
Liberia.   
 
4. Discussion  
 
Like most developing countries Liberia’s 
response to Ebola was greatly hampered by the lack 
of formal instrument for predicting chemical hazard, 
natural disasters and deadly diseases—an essential 
part of any basic healthcare infrastructure that would 
provide a potentially endless as well as essential 
resources for societal characteristics that can promote 
or inhibit resilience [21]. The following comments 
from interviewees confirm the recommendations in 
the advisory group’s report for WHO reform [30].  
“We do not have the type of leadership required to 
support our very dedicated nurses and other 
emergency workers when the health of millions of 
Liberians is threatened by Ebola outbreak”.  A young 
college student claimed: “It is rumored that 
International community has given billions of dollars 
to Liberia to help our plight. But we do not see a 
single report indicating specific program of work, or 
a budget or operations support system, or a set of 
management processes within the local community to 
ease our pain.  Yet Liberians have remain very 
flexible and adaptable to the increasing danger 
simply because of the multi-faceted nature of our 
resistance to natural and disease emergencies.” 
Another interviewee expressed: “Ebola started 8 
months ago but we are yet to true analysis of 
stakeholders on the ground, who are working with 
local leaders and different health cluster partners to 
build a dedicated cluster capacities, and ensure the 
integration of the capacities of Health Cluster 
partners in emergency operations, and avoid 
wastages. How can we avoid Ebola elsewhere if the 
International community does not undertake a 
stakeholder analysis of local partners?” 
All three comments above suggest a situation that 
requires systemic healthcare infrastructure with 
established procedures that prevents common 
challenges of interactions among factors and leads to 
the dynamism of future changes to global public 
health.  Such systems will contribute to a global early 
warning function and global health emergency 
workforces—something that aligns with WHO’s 
plans to define and promote acceptance of common 
professional standards, and build a robust capacity 
for systematized information management as part of 
its work on supporting health workforces and 
technical networks [30]. 
 
4.1. Standards for Resilient Society 
Advances in our understanding of disaster 
resilience in Western society are yet to match the 
increasing need for leadership in developing 
countries during disaster situations—quite often a lot 
more deadly with much less infrastructures available 
to manage the disaster and safe lives [7][25]. 
Resilience is quite often universal in meaning but 
may be unique in applications. Attempts to apply 
resilience that requires doing anything to stay alive 
may lead the resilient person to taking desperate 
actions.  This interviewee was present in 2015 when 
residents of Bushrod Island in Monrovia refused to 
allow care workers into their township to provide 
medical assistance for patients or even collect bodies 
of Ebola victims. “This is not New York or London or 
Rome where the residents have many options to 
choose from during emergency situation. In Liberia, 
we can only make a onetime judgment, unable to 
change what happens after the fact.”  Unlike 
residents of Dallas or Madrid (where patients had 
also been tested positive with the Ebola virus) 
Liberians lived in a resilient society with no control 
over how things play out once they have taken the 
initial actions. 
One interviewee explained “The series of failures 
by United Nations and CDC during the beginning of 
Ebola demonstrates that the entire world remains ill-
prepared to address any threat posed by deadly 
epidemics. The Liberian government had not even 
invested in basic surveillance capacities allowing the 
Ebola virus to initially spread undetected for several 
months”. These vulnerable people felt the need to 
innovate their approach to the unstructured medical 
process by enhancing their resilience.  This proves 
that different kinds of shocks and stresses within an 
already bad healthcare system can combine to bring 
new problems or exacerbate existing problems in 
unforeseen ways.  Liberia was most vulnerable in 
2014 to medical problems and lacked the appropriate 
resources needed for structured processes of 
innovation to deliver scientifically robust solutions 
for reducing risk for Ebola spread [24].  
The local population showed changes in behavior 
and demonstrated appreciation after President Obama 
sent military personnel, followed immediately by 
large volumes of resources from the international 
community to finance the Ebola response. Household 
incomes had suffered greatly as a result of loss of 
wage jobs and self-employment activities in 2014. 
Nearly half of our interviewees confirmed Liberian 
household heads who were working in the first half 
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of 2014 reported being out of work, with those job 
losses concentrated among urban, private-sector 
wage-earners. Government workers also faced 
furlough. As per gender effect of Ebola and jobs in 
Liberia, 60 percent of women versus 40 percent of 
men working in early 2014, had ceased to work by 
December 2014.  
Radical learning is achieved through direct 
interaction with people around the leader and 
engaging in group activities (including town hall 
meetings, conferences, fairs, sports stadiums, etc.) 
where the leader explores new ideas and approaches 
related to his/her role to get things done immediately.  
One local leader lamented: “We are not surprised 
that President Sirleaf did not know how to handle this 
type of crises.  All her cabinet members were out of 
the country when we were suffering here during the 
previous crises.” This represented opinions from 
many in Liberia who assumed the government had 
learned from previous national crisis—establishment 
of pre-disaster ties and common communication tools 
with NGOs—but that proved futile. A government 
official defended the leadership position: “This 
leadership was aware that nearly every previous 
knowledge about crisis management had to be 
abandoned in favor of new knowledge and better 
outcome. Remember all our old knowledge were 
obtained from dealing with a different type of crisis—
civil war, and government coup.”    
This is supported by the UN’s high-level panel on 
the Global Response to Health Crises report that 
acknowledged new and dangerous pathogens can 
emerge in any country in the world. The report 
warned that “poor living conditions mean developing 
countries are particularly vulnerable to impact of 
communicable disease outbreaks. Inadequate 
sanitation can accelerate disease spread and weak 
health systems undermine the capacities to respond” 
[29]. 
Literature also suggest that crisis and leadership 
are intertwined since both concepts have a nature to 
complement one another [6]. One Liberian living 
abroad concluded “The Ebola crises as an event, was 
not neatly delineated, but rather of high uncertainty.  
Liberians—both home and abroad—looked to the 
country leaders for safety and direction. Mrs. Sirleaf 
is not only responsible for responding to threats and 
uncertainties facing all citizens but also has the 
challenge of bringing the situation to a point where 
international investors and Liberian citizens abroad 





4.2. Analysis of Different Dimensions 
World Bank (2006) confirmed stagnation in the 
national economic for 2014 resulted from low diesel 
sales, an 11 percent contraction in money supply 
through 2014, and a 30 percent slump in imports By 
early 2015 government effort led to decline in new 
cases of Ebola.  These were also results of domestic 
aversion behavior abating along with international 
aversion behavior, which was much slower to 
respond.  By late 2014, income shock and higher 
prices for key staples have resulted in widespread 
food insecurity. More than ninety percent of 
households interviewed have cited food insecurity as 
an issue in the survey [29]. 
Liberia’s mining sector remained resilient during 
the Ebola outbreak, although investments to expand 
capacity remain on hold. Another challenge was 
posed by the slowdowns in Chinese and in European 
economics, leading to significant decline in iron ore 
prices—falling to about half in 2015. The resilience 
of manual workers in the rubber farms of Liberia kept 
the country’s second largest export faring a little 
better—falling by only 30 percent. 
As Liberians struggled through a very 
deteriorating economic, the leadership had to respond 
with the appropriate approach, aware that it was 
resulting to several thousand deaths. Resilience 
entails activities that are meant to be focused in 
progressive stages. It begins with i) preventive 
measures, followed by ii) mitigation and followed 
closely by iii) critical decision making by leadership, 
and then finally iv) the eventual push towards a 
return to normalcy.  
 “We are very happy for the private-sector 
construction that is taking place as a result of the 
Ebola-related construction. As this type of 
construction contract winds down, there is a 
reduction of domestic cement production.  Two 
Chinese contractors resumed work on World Bank 
roads projects in December 2014, in addition to 
many new construction in preparations for re-
opening of schools in the spring of 2015.“ 
Resilient leadership in such a situation requires a 
contradictory blend of talent for clear-eyed analysis 
and the ability to take bold action—something shown 
by President Barrack Obama in sending American 
soldiers to Liberia when nearly every airline 
concluded it wasn’t safe to fly into Liberia for fear of 
employees contracting this deadly disease. Like most 
national crises, Ebola was accompanied by a high 
degree of uncertainty. Thus, managing Ebola 
preparation and recovery proved impossible for the 
Liberian government. The Liberian government 
demonstrated resilience through their leadership—
aware that citizens expected an outcome that would 
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keep them alive.  It was this type of resilience in the 
gaze of epidemic that defined the true devastation of 
Ebola in Liberia.  
 
4.3. Society and Cultural Ties 
 While the outside world struggled to comprehend 
any perceived benefit of physical interactions 
(handshakes, hugging and similar behaviors during 
the Ebola crisis), Liberians were culturally resilience, 
regularly examined the benefits in their interactions 
with others—who could have been infected with the 
deadly disease—but only if they believed that 
participating in the cultural exchange process would 
bring them little satisfactory rewards during a time of 
total grim in the local society.  
 “Because of Ebola control, we are expected to 
live as individuals.  We are not allowed to touch our 
family and friends by hugging and handshakes. Ebola 
has also forced us to move from big cities into rural 
villages, and work as farmers.”  Despite this 
interviewee claims, harvests for spring 2015 was 
significantly plumage. Eighty percent of participants 
blamed the reduction in crops to reduced labor 
sharing, leading to further reductions in food supply 
for 2015. 
“As Ebola spreads throughout the country, the 
rural community has become increasingly uncertain 
with constrained resources.  This has forced local 
leaders to result to autonomous innovations which 
should be flexible and instinct-driven, that will allow 
us to function through a variety of disturbances in 
this challenging and very deadly situation.” This 
comment from a local community leader confirms 
conclusions from literature that operational 
effectiveness during outbreaks and emergencies 
requires leadership positioning themselves as 
operational organization while maintaining 
leadership in technical expertise.  
“Our leadership is valuable to solving this 
problem because our community is on the front-line 
of the Ebola outbreak.  We are responsible and 
accountable for issuing appropriate alerts and 
responding to a suspected Ebola cases. We need 
health systems and architecture that contain 
foundational capabilities for effective preparedness 
and response.” This comment, also from a local 
community leader, confirms literature about the 
inadequate implementation of national obligations 
under the weak health systems, governance 
challenges, and poor engagement with communities 
hampered the ability of national authorities to stem 
the spread of the virus [17][29].  
Similar comments from Interviewees support 
literature that leaders of global healthcare (WHO) 
should proactively define and promote acceptance of 
common professional standards on health 
interventions, sharing information and handling 
personal health data. Investing in worldwide Health 
Systems would build robust capacity for systematized 
information management and protocols to enable 
health data from multiple sources to be shared [33]. 
Implementation of a sustainable emergency system, 
procedures and capacity to develop and update 
resilience to deadly diseases should be an ongoing 
objective of WHO, including rapid availability of an 
interactive, accessible IS repository for Ebola 
management. 
Many Liberians used mobile technology to spread 
information about government policies and plans for 
actions relating to suspected Ebola cases and Ebola 
control team arrivals into different villages. “It would 
have been in national interest to take advantage of 
existing mobile technology (spread throughout the 
remote districts of Liberia) to deliver a strong public 
health message to the Liberians. Isn’t it mind-
blowing when people report the lack of 
communication technology between Monrovia and 
Ganta (around 200 miles apart) yet family members 
in USA (more than 6000 miles away) were 
practically in constant communications—via mobile 
technology—immediately after a family member 
showed symptom of serious illness? These comments 
demonstrate that in the absence of a well-functioning 
healthcare infrastructure, any country can be exposed 
to a catastrophe far more destructive than national 
security, as experienced by Liberia in 2014. 
Resilience in such environment allows the 
institutionalization of political agendas when 
budgeting for national healthcare and avoiding 
improper prioritizations, which may increase the risk 
of deadly disease spread, lower the morale of health 
care workers, and diminish patients’ quality of life 
[5][14]. Resilience in culture meant caring for sick 
family members—something very central to West 
African culture. The researcher noticed a well-
established communications system between groups 
of Liberians spread around the world, usually as part 
of similar descendants of past inhabitants of certain 
families within a specific territory.  This is exclusive 
of other groups within a small territory, and formed 
by involuntary membership of an inclusive category.   
All people privileged to the news of a seriously sick 
family member would usually belong to one tribal 
group, by reason of being extended families and/or 
inhabiting the region—sometimes referred to as 
normative tribalism, and semantically correct to 
describe it as a form of local-mindedness. Because 
certain financially influential members of such 
extended family may now be living in the West, it 
has become imperative to use mobile technology to 
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spread such sick news—thus, improving explain the 
role of family ties through culture during resilience to 
a deadly disease.  
“Ebola outbreak has not been able to keep our 
residents away from complementary leisure facilities, 
and other tourist resources frequently used to meet 
their needs for home-based tourism. We use friendly 
attitude—hugs and handshakes at every 
opportunity—to establish channels of communication 
with the outside world. Research aligns with these 
comments that once established, negative reputations 
are very difficult to change [18][28]. 
A good strategy for developing a national 
healthcare infrastructure must have certain essential 
elements. Such strategy must include standards for 
effective data sharing.   
 
5. Research Limitation and Future 
Research  
 
This paper uses data from a telephone interview 
which is a rarely used research method but the 
justification is the researcher’s inability to travel to 
the research locations during a deadly disease 
outbreak.  While the results of this research may not 
be generalizable, due to the rare occurrence of Ebola 
outbreak, they definitely fill a critical gap in the 
literature and also be applicable in similar contexts. 
One limitation of this method is the lack of attempt to 
address the effect of non-relations sampling. 
Intuitively obtaining information from people who 
are considered old friends and former colleagues, as 
well as close contacts of the researcher’s family 
members and their neighbors—all facing life-and-
death situations—making it more likely the survey 
would produce specific theme-relevant material. 
This exploratory study has raised several issues 
that provide fruitful avenues for future research in the 
area of disaster resilience in developing countries.  
First, several contingencies have been identified 
(stages in decision making process, involvement of 
local authorities, etc.) as possible explanations for 
strong resilience during a deadly disease outbreak in 
developing countries.  The study will now be 
expanded to include longitudinal and participatory 
research techniques [32] involving local researchers 
based at the University of Liberia and other partners 
with NGOs in Monrovia.  Future research on the 
impact of disaster resilience in developing countries 




6. Conclusions  
 
To answer our major questions, we have seen 
how Liberians exhibit resilience, evidencing normal 
life in the face of adversity. Despite Ebola killing 
children, women and old people, there was no 
evidence of any negative effects at the individual, 
family, community, and cultural levels—contributing 
to an understanding of resilience processes within 
non-Western populations. Although some general 
trends in disaster resilience may extend beyond good 
leadership /government, resilience here was strongly 
influenced by culture.  
For resilience research, social competence has 
generally been operationalized on the basis of 
observable, behavioral criteria, with assessments 
based on achievements [8] [13]. This paper aligns 
with literature that demonstrate the importance of 
ensuring resilience processes are informed—and 
where possible set—by those who must change [7]. 
Additionally, the paper has aligned with the 
unfortunate events in Liberian history, especially the 
Ebola outbreak and argues for seeing communities 
not merely as victims of disaster but also as agents of 
resilience. 
By early 2015, the international community—led 
by USA—had to send both military and medical 
personnel to help Liberian government control Ebola 
spread.  Through this strategy, the Liberian 
leadership demonstrated a certain type of resilience, 
being flexible in decision making and operations, 
adaptability to disaster conditions, and effective 
communication with other stakeholders and the 
public as the most valuable resource required for 
leading a developing country through the outbreak of 
a deadly disease. 
The second implication of this finding is the 
protective versus vulnerability effects across the 
populations studied. For instance, while the local 
population was frightened and intentionally still 
indoors—being protective with regard to disruptive 
behaviors during a medical crisis, the society was 
functioning as a vulnerability factor for other 
domains and therefore being described as public 
disobedience. For an economically disadvantaged 
citizen, facing Ebola, on the other hand, increasing 
freedom to express their frustration at the system was 
a desirable outcome. 
Apart from public demonstration, caring for 
former family member was another variable that was 
found to be a vulnerability factor [14]. This variable, 
too, has been previously shown to serve protective 
functions, in experimental as well as longitudinal 
investigations [2].  
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Previous theoretical and empirical works in the 
area have contained cautionary statements on the use 
of terms such as “invulnerable” and “resilient.” For 
instance, it has often been noted that resilience is not 
necessarily continuous over time but is, instead, 
interspersed with setbacks under certain 
circumstances [8][9][26]. Evidence that resilient 
population in this study were significantly more 
depressed and anxious than were government 
officials suggests that while the type of problems 
developed may vary, some type of difficulties may 
inevitably be associated with a population gazing at 
Ebola. 
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